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Israel
divorce law
18-year aguna suing
Justice Ministry
Dan Izenberg , THE
JERUSALEM POST Oct. 29, 2007
Rachel Avraham waited
18 years for her divorce. She was 36 years old when she left her
husband, home and all her property behind in Yavne and took a cab with
her five daughters and one son, ranging in age from 14 years to half a
year, to her parents' home in Binyamina.
During the years she
was an aguna, or a woman denied a religious divorce by her husband,
Avraham raised the six children on her own, paid a hefty sum of money
for lawyers to represent her in the endless court hearings she attended,
and had to reject two marriage offers because she was still a married
woman.
Last month, in an
unprecedented lawsuit, Avraham, backed by the non profit organization,
Center for Women's Justice (CWJ), sued the Justice Ministry, which is in
charge of the rabbinical courts, for NIS 4.5 million in Ramat Gan Family
Court.
According to the
lawsuit, filed on Avraham's behalf by CWJ attorneys Susan Weiss and
Yifat Frankenburg, "The religious courts handled her case with clear and
criminal negligence. For example, the court let hearings drag on, handed
down contradictory rulings and exceeded its powers when it canceled the
divorce the husband had granted her. It also violated her basic rights
by allowing her husband to dictate the terms of the divorce and treated
her with deliberate and inexcusable hostility after she turned to the
civil courts for remedy."
In response to a query
by The Jerusalem Post regarding the allegations in the lawsuit and
charges made by Avraham in an interview with the paper, Efrat Ohrbach,
the spokeswoman for the rabbinical courts, issued the following
statement: "I would like to point out that two earlier petitions filed
by Ms. Avraham were rejected by the High Court of Justice. The following
is a quote from the ruling in one of the cases which speaks for itself:
'[Avraham's] attorney... admitted to us that the declaration she made
before the supreme and regional rabbinical courts about her consent to
hold a new hearing regarding the property settlement, this time
according to religious law, was a trick that she resorted to in order to
extract a divorce by deceit."
Ohrbach added that the
state's full response to the lawsuit would be provided by the State
Attorney's Office.
The rabbinical court
response addresses only one of many allegations included in Avraham's
lawsuit. At most, the response could be construed as insinuating that
just as the woman had allegedly lied to obtain her divorce, she could
very likely be lying about other facts she claimed in the lawsuit. But
it does not provide any such proof.
Avraham, who now lives
in her own home in Binyamina, dresses in the modest clothing and head
coverings of the religious community.
She alleged that as
soon as she married and moved into her husband's home, she found that he
would get angry over insignificant matters. He also allegedly got angry
at her for giving birth to daughters as her first two children. After
the third baby turned out to be a boy, Avraham returned to form and gave
birth to three more girls.
"He accused me of
deliberately giving birth to girls to spite him," said Avraham. When the
fourth baby was born, she said, he did not come to visit her in the
hospital.
Twice during these
years, Avraham filed for divorce in the Ashdod regional rabbinical
court. Both times, the rabbinical court judges urged shalom bayit
(reconciliation), and she agreed.
After the sixth child
also turned out to be a girl, he allegedly started shouting and carrying
on in the delivery room. This time, said Avraham, she had had enough.
She told her husband she intended to leave him and was willing to give
up all the property on condition that he did not contest the divorce. He
agreed to this, she said.
"On August 5, 1987, I
took my children, ordered a taxi and left with NIS 150 in my purse," she
said.
But the husband
allegedly reneged on his word. According to the lawsuit, on the very day
she left, he filed a counterclaim in court, saying his wife had
"rebelled" against him.
After four years, on
November 18, 1991, the regional court handed down a decision declaring
there was no hope for a reconciliation and the husband should grant a
divorce.
The husband appealed
the decision to the Supreme Rabbinical Court. It took one year for the
court to hear the case, and then it ruled that the lower court decision
had only been a recommendation and referred the case back to it.
The lower court again
ruled on February 17, 1994 that the husband should grant a divorce. Once
again he appealed, and once again the Supreme Rabbinical Court overruled
the lower court. Avraham returned to the lower court. On February 2,
1996, the court again ordered the husband to grant a divorce, this time
after hearing witnesses testify to the husband's abuse and ordering the
wife to take a lie detector test which indicated that she was telling
the truth.
Once again, the husband
appealed the decision. This time, the Supreme Rabbinical Court upheld
the lower court ruling. By this time, 10 years had gone by, and although
the court had ordered the husband to grant Avraham a divorce, he had not
yet done so.
In 1991, Avraham told
the Post, she decided to demand a property settlement in the civil
court. She said she did this because her husband had not lived up to his
side of the bargain by contesting the divorce after she had left all the
property behind. The civil court negotiated a compromise settlement
whereby Rachel Avraham was to receive 24 percent of the value of the
house and half of a financial portfolio.
After the Supreme
Rabbinical Court ordered Avraham's husband to divorce her, the husband
filed another request to the Ashdod regional rabbinical court, insisting
that the divorce be made conditional on reopening the property
settlement, this time in the religious court.
The lower rabbinical
court rejected the request. He then appealed to the higher rabbinical
court, which also rejected the request. Since the husband continued to
refuse to grant the divorce, the higher rabbinical court instructed the
regional one to apply sanctions against the husband.
On February 15, 1998,
the lower rabbinical court ordered the recalcitrant husband to spend six
months in jail. On the same day, the husband's lawyer informed the court
that his client had again appealed to the higher rabbinical court and
that he must therefore be released. He was released the same day.
In the appeal, the
husband asked the court to change its mind regarding the decision
against reopening the property settlement.
On March 30, 1998, the
higher rabbinical court heard the husband's appeal.
According to Avraham's
lawsuit, "the Supreme Rabbinical Court put pressure on Rachel to give in
to her husband and forgo his property obligations toward her and the
children. The court, in its criminal negligence toward Rachel, helped
the husband, who was refusing to obey the court ruling to grant her a
divorce, to extort her in return for the divorce."
Two months later, the
court ruled that Avraham would only obtain the divorce if she agreed to
reopen the property settlement.
"Until now, I still
believed in the rabbis," she told the Post. "But this decision broke me.
From this moment on, I stopped believing in the court. I regarded the
decision as inhuman, unjust and wicked."
Avraham petitioned the
High Court of Justice against the rabbinical court ruling, but her
appeal was rejected. As a result, she told the rabbinical court she
would obey the decision. On October 19, 1999, 12 years after filing for
divorce, Rachel finally received it.
Soon afterwards,
however, on August 3, 2000, Rachel petitioned the High Court of Justice
again, asking it to cancel her agreement to reopen the property
settlement because she had made it under pressure. The court rejected
the petition in May 2001.
In the meantime, the
husband petitioned the High Rabbinical Court again, demanding that the
divorce be cancelled because Rachel had gone to the High Court of
Justice. On April 30, 2000, the High Rabbinical Court "suspended" the
divorce. Rachel was a married woman again.
Finally, the hearings
on the property settlement began in the Haifa regional rabbinical court
two years after the High Court of Justice ruling. The court asked
witnesses to testify again (13 years after Rachel left her husband) and
ordered Rachel and her husband to take lie detector tests. On November
25, 2003, it ruled that the civil court property settlement should
remain intact, but ordered Rachel to pay her $6,000 in court costs for
having petitioned the High Court of Justice.
Once again, the husband
appealed the ruling to the higher rabbinical court. On October 21, 2004,
the Supreme Rabbinical Court heard the appeal and ruled that the
property settlement would remain intact, but waived the interest that
the husband owed Avraham for all the years that he had not given her the
money that had been awarded to her. The interest was estimated at NIS
160,000. It also ruled that she must be divorced again.
According to Avraham,
the Haifa regional rabbinical court set four dates for the divorce
ceremony. The husband did not show up for any of them. The matter was
then referred to the Supreme Rabbinical Court, which set three dates for
the ceremony. Once again, the husband did not show. Finally, on January
22, 2006, Avraham's lawyers persuaded the Supreme Rabbinical Court to
"revive" the divorce that had been granted and then withdrawn six years
earlier.
Weiss, the founder of
the Center for Women's Justice, told the Post that the Avraham case was
a classic one for revealing so many different faults in the rabbinical
court system - for example, that there is no finality in its rulings,
that it allows husband to manipulate the system and that the courts
themselves indulge in a power struggle with the secular courts.
She said since the
Justice Ministry was in charge of the religious courts, they were
ultimately responsible for its faults.
"In this lawsuit, we're
saying, 'Something's wrong, and someone must take responsibility,'" said
Weiss. "And it's not just the husbands or the rabbinical courts."
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Domestic Relations Laws in
Israel
by Neil J. Saltzman, Israeli attorney-at-law
(Mr. Saltzman is now based in New York City and may be contacted
through our office)
Domestic relations matters in Israel are in the jurisdiction of two
separate court systems: the civil courts and the religious courts.
Religious courts have been established for each of the major religions
in Israel. There are Jewish rabbinic courts; Sharai Islamic courts;
Christian religious courts; and Druse courts. The jurisdiction of the
religious courts is exclusive in some areas of domestic relations, and
concurrent with the civilian courts in others. The jurisdictional rules
applying to mixed marriages, and members of no recognized religion are
unique and will not be discussed here.
This essay will focus on the legal system in Israel as it affects Jews.
Jewish rabbinic courts have exclusive jurisdiction in connection with
marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel. If a party initiating a divorce
action explicitly includes a related claim, such as a claim for
maintenance or child support, and no other claim on that same related
matter was previously submitted to the civil courts, the rabbinic courts
obtain exclusive jurisdiction in connection with the related claim as
well. One matter that is always considered to be included in the divorce
action, whether mentioned explicitly or not, is the issue of child
custody. Unless a claim on the issue of child custody was submitted to
the civil courts prior to the filing of the divorce action, the rabbinic
courts will automatically have exclusive jurisdiction on that issue when
the divorce action is filed. For this reason, litigating spouses often
race to file first in the system that they believe favors their
interests, and a party suing for divorce must be careful to open a child
custody file in the civil courts before initiating the divorce action if
he feels that the civil courts will benefit his interests.
Besides divorce actions Jewish rabbinic courts have jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the civil courts in matters of spousal
maintenance, child support, guardianship, inheritance and adoption,
among others. For most of these actions the agreement of all parties is
required in order for the rabbinic court to obtain jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, the rabbinic courts apply Jewish religious law in
its adjudications. The Israeli High Court of Justice has carved out
several exceptions to this rule obligating the rabbinic courts to follow
general civil law in connection with the division of marital property
(absent agreement of all parties to apply religious law) and to give
proper weight to principles of basic human rights as defined and
established in Israels Basic Laws.
Rabbinic courts have the authority to force compliance with its orders,
including those requiring husbands to grant a Jewish divorce, with tools
ranging from revocation of a drivers licenses to prison terms for
recalcitrant parties.
The civil court possessing jurisdiction in matters of domestic relations
is Family Court. Family Court has jurisdiction in matters of personal
status, including child support, maintenance, guardianship, division of
marital property and filiation proceedings. It also has jurisdiction in
matters of inheritance, civil disputes between family members where the
relationship is relevant to the dispute, adoption and a number of
others. Where the religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction the
Family Court retreats. Where the religious courts have already exercised
concurrent jurisdiction the Family Court will also retreat. Otherwise,
agreement of all parties is not required to bring an issue before Family
Court.
In matters of child support and maintenance Family Court will apply
Jewish Law to Jewish couples. Relevant rules include a fathers duty,
regardless of issues of legitimacy to pay for a childs basic needs until
that childs achieving majority. The extent of this obligation varies
with a childs age, the fathers income, to a more limited extent the
mothers income, and any special needs the child may have. The details
are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that the
obligation of a Jewish father to pay child support is absolute,
unaffected by issues of legitimacy, visitation and, as applied by some
courts in Israel, to some extent unrelated even to the ability to pay.
The National Insurance Institute (a government body) will often pay
child support up to a certain amount in place of a delinquent father,
seeking collection from that father in turn. The courts typically use
these maximum statutory National Insurance amounts as baselines for
support awards even in connection with the poorest and least employable
of fathers.
The obligation to pay spousal maintenance exists only as long as the
marriage and falls only upon the husband; there is no Jewish form of
post- divorce alimony. This fact sometimes counteracts a husbands
unwillingness to grant his wife a Jewish divorce since he typically has
to pay as long as the couple is married, and is sometimes abused by
married women who prefer maintenance payments to a finalized divorce
even when they have no intention to reconcile. While Jewish law offers a
solution to both problems (the rules of meukevet machmato and moredet),
the levels of proof required for their application by both the religious
and civil courts in Israel make them rather weak tools in todays
proceedings there.
In this context let it be noted that stay of exit orders against
defendant spouses and parents are not especially difficult to get in
Israel, though more rigorous standards apply if the subject of the order
is a foreign citizen.
Divorce agreements require court approval to be enforceable. By statute
division of the marital estate is by and large equitable with exceptions
for pre-marriage property, inheritances and gifts received by one spouse
only and several other types of assets. Donative intent can override the
exception and create joint holder status where it otherwise would not
have existed.
Navigating the Israeli court system in the context of domestic relations
law requires expertise and it is always advisable to obtain legal advice
in connection with any proceeding- whether adversarial or not. A number
of potential procedural and legal landmines exist for the uninitiated
that can have significant effect on the outcome of a case. The details
are many and the above survey is just that- a survey reflective of the
general rules and the courts application of them at the time of this
writing. It cannot be depended on as applicable in any specific
situation or as a substitute for legal advice in relation to a specific
case.
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