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General rules of domicile 

Domicile in Australia

Domicile in Canada

Domicile in Hong Kong

Domicile in India

Domicile in Ireland

Domicile in Malaysia

Domicile in New Zealand

Domicile in Singapore

Domicile in South Africa

Domicile in United Kingdom 


 

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 DOMICILE AND FAMILY LAW

The Law of Domicile

in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom

 

Domicile is a tremendously important connecting factor in most common law countries, providing a most significant basis for a court to be authorized to accept jurisdiction in family law cases.

The following outline of the rules of domicile of adults as applied in various common law countries is adapted from the April 2005 Report of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong on the Rules for Determining Domicile. 

General rules of domicile 

First, no person can be without a domicile.  It is well established that everyone must have a domicile.[1]  A person cannot choose to be without a domicile, even though he can choose to change his domicile.  Every independent person must have a domicile, either of origin or of choice.  Every dependent person must also have a domicile, either that of the person on whom he is dependent or that otherwise attributed by law.  

Secondly, no person can at the same time for the same purpose have more than one domicile.[2]  However, in a federal or composite state consisting of a number of different jurisdictions, there may be statutes creating one domicile for one purpose and another domicile for other purposes.  For example, section 39(3)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Commonwealth) in Australia creates an Australian domicile (as distinct from a domicile in one of the various states, such as Queensland) for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction.  Therefore, a person can have two domiciles in Australia: one for matrimonial causes and another for other issues.  Conversely, in the absence of any equivalent legislation, a person domiciled in Hong Kong cannot concurrently be domiciled in the PRC and vice versa.

Thirdly, an existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proved that a new domicile has been acquired.[3]  The burden of proving a change of domicile rests with the person asserting such a change.[4]  The strength of the presumption differs for different types of domicile, ranging from domicile of dependency (which is weakest) to domicile of origin which is "more enduring… hold[s] stronger, and [is] less easily shaken off".[5]

Fourthly, the courts in a specific country will apply local law in determining a person's domicile.  The person's nationality or foreign connection may be irrelevant to that determination.  Hence, applying the local law of domicile, the local courts may determine that a person has acquired a domicile of choice in another jurisdiction, even though he has not satisfied the requirements for domicile imposed by the law of that other jurisdiction.  Similarly, where a person has a domicile of origin in another jurisdiction, the law of domicile of that jurisdiction is not relevant to the local courts' decision as to whether he has acquired a local domicile of choice.[6] 

 

Domicile in Australia

 

In Australia, any person who is over eighteen years of age or is married has the ability to acquire an independent domicile.[7]  However, a person suffering from mental incapacity is not capable of obtaining a domicile of his choice.[8] 

At common law, where a person has left his homeland with the intention of not returning, his domicile of origin continues until he acquires a domicile of choice.[9]  He can acquire a domicile of choice in another country by being there lawfully with the intention of remaining there permanently or indefinitely.  The two conditions of physical presence and the required intention must co-exist.  The length of the physical presence is not determinative.  Even though a person's permission to stay in a country is only for a limited period, he can still obtain a domicile of choice there if his presence there is lawful when his intention to stay there indefinitely is formed.[10]  His new domicile once acquired is not lost upon expiry of the permission to stay,[11] or even after deportation.[12] 

The word "permanent" in connection with the required intention at common law ("an intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country") at times imposes a stringent requirement which makes it impossible to obtain a domicile of choice unless the person in question has abandoned any intention of eventually returning to his home country.  Asprey JA of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, however, in Hyland v Hyland[13] put the common law test in a more flexible way: 

"In the context of the principles applicable to a domicile of choice I am of the opinion that the use of the word 'permanent' means nothing more than Lord Westbury's phrase 'general and indefinite' which, as I understand it, produces the result that the person's intention is one which, when formed, is to remain a resident of the country for a period then regarded by him as unlimited in time and without having addressed himself to the question of giving up such residence and leaving the country of his choice upon the happening of some particular and definite event in the foreseeable future notwithstanding that he may entertain in the phraseology which appears to have been coined by Story (Conflict of Laws, 8th ed p 50) a floating intention to return at some future period of time to his native country…"[14] 

The distinction is between a definite intention to leave and a "floating intention".  According to Asprey JA, the required intention is to remain in a country for a period regarded as unlimited in time and without the intention of leaving in the foreseeable future, such as on the completion of a contract of employment.[15]  A hope of returning to one's home country at some unspecified time in the future, or a willingness to move elsewhere for better opportunities, will not water down the intention to remain in a country.[16]  A person, however, who has an intention to go back to his home country on the happening of a definite future event (though distant and unspecified in time, such as retirement) will not acquire a new domicile of choice.[17] 

The Domicile Act 1982 (Commonwealth) has no specific provision on the nature of physical presence required, but it provides for the requisite intention: to make one's home indefinitely in the country concerned.[18]  The question is whether it has changed the common law test as defined by Asprey JA in the Hyland case.  No authority can be found in Australia, but a New Zealand decision on a similar provision[19] suggests that the test formulated by Asprey JA is still applicable.  In this case, despite a residence of thirty-five years in the United States, it was held that a New Zealander had not acquired a domicile there since he had at all times a definite intention to go back to New Zealand upon retirement.  This is in line with the common law test defined by Asprey JA.[20] 

At common law, a person can lose his domicile of choice by leaving the country and by abandoning the intention of residing there indefinitely.  The domicile of choice will be abandoned once these two elements co-exist.  Under the pre-1982 law, if a person has not acquired a new domicile upon the abandonment of the old one, his domicile of origin will revive until he obtains another domicile of choice.  Where a person who had a Tasmanian domicile of origin and a New Zealand domicile of choice decided to move permanently to England but died in a plane crash on his way there, his domicile as at the date of death would be Tasmanian.  This is because he had abandoned his New Zealand domicile of choice but had not yet acquired a new domicile in England.  Hence, his domicile of origin would revive.  The post-1982 law expressly abolishes the concept of revival of domicile of origin, and an existing domicile continues until a different domicile is acquired.[21]  Applying this to our example, the deceased's domicile of choice in New Zealand would continue until his actual arrival in England. 

 

Domicile in Canada

In Manitoba, every person has the ability to acquire an independent domicile provided he is not a child or mentally incompetent.[22]  His domicile of choice is in the place where he has his principal home and where he intends to reside.[23]  There is a presumption that a person intends to reside indefinitely where his principal home is, subject to his contrary intention.[24]  The common law requirements of physical presence and intention are retained, though in different wording.  It is difficult to say how much the statutory provision has changed the common law and, indeed, whether it has changed the common law at all.[25]

The common law rule which results in the revival of the domicile of origin is abolished,[26] and a person's existing domicile continues until a new one is obtained.[27]  The effect of this should be the same as that of the equivalent Australian provision abolishing the concept of revival of domicile of origin discussed above.

 

 Domicile in Hong Kong 

According to the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 410), a person attains majority for most purposes when he is eighteen years of age.[28]  On reaching eighteen years of age, a person remains domiciled in the country where he was domiciled immediately before reaching the age of eighteen.[29]  If he abandons that domicile, either he will acquire a domicile of choice or his dormant domicile of origin will revive.[30]  Cap 410 came into operation on 1 October 1990, and the former age of majority (twenty-one) still applies to transactions which occurred prior to that date. 

Domicile of choice 

Where a person has left his homeland with the intention of not returning, his domicile of origin continues until he acquires a domicile of choice.[31]  A person can acquire a domicile of choice by the combination of residence in a country and the intention of permanently or indefinitely residing there, but not otherwise.  Mere residence without intention is not enough, and the intention must be demonstrated by actual residence. 

"Residence" appears to involve little more than mere physical presence, but it does not include the case where a person is present "casually or as a traveller".[32]  The "residence" must be physical presence in a country "as an inhabitant of it".[33]  Apart from this, residence may be established without any mental element.[34]  The length of residence is not by itself conclusive, and is only important as evidence of animus manendi, the intention of permanent or indefinite residence.[35]  It is not necessary that the length of residence be long.[36]  Residence for a few days,[37] or for a period even shorter than that,[38] may be enough. 

The "intention" required is to reside permanently or for an unlimited time in a particular country.[39]  The residence must be general and indefinite in its future contemplation, and not just for a limited period or particular purpose.[40]  The intention must be directed exclusively towards one country.[41]  The intention need not be irrevocable in nature,[42] nor is it necessary that it be for the purpose of acquiring a domicile.[43]  It also suffices if the intention is negative in form: residing in a country without any intention of leaving it for one's former country of domicile or any other country.[44]  A possible move to another country which is dependent on a contingency may have different consequences according to the nature of the contingency.  If it is unlikely to occur, such as making a fortune,[45] this would not be sufficient to detract from the individual's intention of permanent or indefinite residence in the country where he is residing.  However, if the contingency is clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated, such as the termination of a contract of employment,[46] this may prevent him from establishing the requisite intention to settle in the country where he is residing.

 

Any fact which is evidence of a person's residence, or of his intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in deciding whether he has acquired a domicile of choice in that country.[47]  No fact can be regarded as a definite criterion of the existence of the required intention.  A fact may be considered as relevant in one case, but can be regarded as irrelevant in another.[48]

 

Abandonment of a domicile of choice 

A domicile of choice can be abandoned by ceasing both to reside and to intend to reside in that country permanently or indefinitely, and not otherwise.[49]  Giving up residence[50] or the intention to reside[51] alone will not abandon a domicile of choice.  As far as intention is concerned, it is sufficient to prove the absence of an intention to continue to reside and there is no need to prove a positive intention not to return.[52]  However, a mere dissatisfaction with the country of the domicile of choice is not sufficient.[53]  Residence can simply be given up, and not necessarily only by arriving in another country.[54]

 

Revival of domicile of origin 

On abandoning his domicile of dependency or his domicile of choice, a person may acquire a new domicile of choice.  Alternatively, he may simply abandon his domicile of dependency or his domicile of choice without acquiring a home in another country.  In this case, his domicile of origin revives,[55] irrespective of where he is or what his plans are for the future.

 

Domicile of dependency of married women 

For the purpose of the law of domicile, a married woman is a dependent person.  Accordingly, she cannot acquire a domicile of choice[56] by her own actions, and is dependent upon her husband.  If she is a minor, her dependence on her husband will prevail over her dependence on her father.  In other words, a married woman's domicile is the same as, and changes with her husband's domicile.  This rule applies even where the spouses live apart in different countries,[57] whether or not this is according to a formal separation agreement.[58]  The rule also applies where a wife has obtained a decree of judicial separation.[59]  Where a marriage is void from the beginning, a woman remains capable of acquiring a domicile of her choice.[60]  However, if a marriage is valid or subsisting initially (voidable), a woman shares her husband's domicile until it is annulled.[61]

On ceasing to be dependent, a person continues to be domiciled in the country of his or her last domicile of dependency.  In the case of a married woman, she will retain her existing domicile of dependency as a domicile of choice, even after she acquires the legal ability to change it.  A married woman's dependency ends, for instance, on her husband's death or the granting of a decree of divorce, but she will continue to be domiciled in the country of her last domicile of dependency until she acquires a different domicile of choice.  Such a change can be the result of acts done during dependency.  Hence, a married woman who is settled in a country other than that of her husband's domicile during her dependency can acquire a new domicile in that country as soon as her dependency ends.[62]

In Hong Kong, a married woman can have her own independent domicile for certain limited purposes.  Section 11C of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap 179) provides that a married woman's domicile shall "be ascertained by reference to the same factors as in the case of any other individual capable of having an independent domicile", instead of merely following her husband's.  However, this provision applies only for the purposes of Part II of Cap 179 (ie the jurisdiction of court in respect of divorce, nullity, judicial separation, etc).  Generally speaking, a married woman's domicile still follows her husband's.

  

Domicile of dependency of the mentally incapacitated[63]  

Although different jurisdictions discussed in Chapter 4 may use different terminologies, we are essentially referring to the same type of persons, ie those who are unable to exercise their will because of their mental condition.  Not every person who suffers from any of the recognised types of mental incapacity will be treated as a "dependent person".  It is a question of fact as to whether or not a mentally incapacitated person is an independent person and can therefore change his domicile.[64]  The question is whether the person has the ability to form the necessary intention to make his home in a country permanently or indefinitely.  It does not seem appropriate to link the question of capacity for the purposes of the law of domicile to the use of compulsory detention or guardianship.[65] 

The general rule is that a mentally incapacitated person who is regarded as a dependent person for the purpose of the law of domicile cannot acquire a domicile of choice by his own actions, but retains the domicile which he had when he was first legally regarded as mentally incapacitated for so long as he remains in that condition.[66]  The rationale is that acquisition and abandonment of a domicile of choice require the exercise of will, and a mentally incapacitated person may be "unable to exercise any will".[67] 

There is, however, an exception to this general rule.  The domicile of a person who is born mentally incapacitated, or becomes mentally incapacitated while he is a dependent child, is determined, while he remains mentally incapacitated, as if he continued to be a dependent child.[68] 

 

Burden and standard of proof 

The burden of proving a change of domicile rests with the person alleging such a change.  A domicile of origin is more tenacious and it is harder to prove that a person has abandoned his domicile of origin than his domicile of choice.[69]  Where the change is from a domicile of origin to a domicile of choice, the older case law indicates that the standard of proof is more onerous than the balance of probabilities[70] applied in other civil cases, and the elements of "residence" and "intention" must be shown with "perfect clearness and satisfaction"[71] or "beyond a mere balance of probabilities".[72]  More recent cases,[73] however, prefer the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof.  The position appears to be uncertain. 

 

Domicile in India

 

In India, a person's domicile of origin prevails until he acquires a new domicile.[74]  If a person is not insane,[75] on reaching eighteen years of age[76] he may acquire a domicile of choice in a country by fulfilling two conditions: residence in the country concerned and intention to live there permanently.  The co-existence of residence and intention is necessary for obtaining a domicile of choice, but intention can precede residence, or it can be formed after years of residence.   

Section 10 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 provides that a person acquires a new domicile by taking up his fixed habitation in a country which is not his domicile of origin.  It was held by the Supreme Court of India in Central Bank of India v Ram Narayan[77] that even though the defendant had the intention to move to India, he was still domiciled in Pakistan before he actually lived in India.  The period of residence need not be long, and brief residence will not necessarily negative the possibility of acquiring a domicile.   

The required intention is to reside in a country permanently or for an unlimited time.  The intention must be fixed but not fickle, and must also be directed towards one particular country.  A person's intention can be gathered from all the events and circumstances of his life.[78]  It is the cumulative effect of all the facts which indicates his intention, and no one single fact is determinative.  The intention to reside permanently or for an unlimited time in a country must be made voluntarily.  A person is not deemed to have taken up his fixed habitation in India merely because of residing there in the civil, military, naval or air force service or in the exercise of any profession or calling.[79] 

Where a person stops residing in the country of the domicile of choice and has no intention to reside there indefinitely, he abandons his domicile of choice.  Mere intention to abandon, or mere residence in another country, will not suffice.  The concept of revival of domicile of origin does not apply in India since a person's domicile continues until he acquires another one or his former domicile resumes.[80] 

 

Domicile in Ireland

 

On reaching the age of majority, a person can obtain a domicile of his choice in Ireland provided that he is not mentally incapable.  The Age of Majority Act 1985[81] changed the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen, or to the time of marriage where that takes place below the age of eighteen. 

In Ireland, the acquisition and abandonment of a domicile of choice are still governed by the common law.  In order to acquire a domicile of choice, a person is required to satisfy two conditions: residence and intention.  Casual presence in a country (for example, as a traveller) is not enough, but the length of the residence is immaterial.  The required intention is the intention of remaining in a country permanently or indefinitely.  The words "permanent" and "indefinite" have been used interchangeably in a number of decisions.[82]  Walker C of the Irish Court of Appeal observed that it was obvious that, as the word "indefinite" had no fixed legal meaning, every case had to depend on its own special facts.[83]  Sir P O'Brien CJ in the same case quoted with approval and applied the following test formulated by Lord Westbury in the English case of Udny v Udny:[84] 

"Domicil of choice is a conclusion or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time.  This is a description of the circumstances which create or constitute a domicil, and not a definition of the term.  There must be a residence, freely chosen, and not prescribed or dictated by any external necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands of creditors, or the relief from illness; and it might be a residence fixed, not for a particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation.  It is true that residence, originally temporary, or intended for a limited period, may afterwards become general and unlimited; and in such a case, so soon as the change of purpose, or animus manendi, can be inferred, the fact of domicil is established." 

Sir P O'Brien CJ commented: 

"This is the language of Lord Westbury in what appears to me to be the greatest, the most luminous, and, though not long, the most comprehensive judgment that is to be found in our English law books upon the law of domicil.  It has been adopted as laying down the true test by which domicil has been determined in all subsequent cases, …".[85] 

To obtain an independent domicile, a person's residence in a country must co-exist with the required intention, but it does not matter which comes first.  An emigrant may have the required intention before leaving for the new country; a person fleeing from persecution may form the required intention years later.[86] 

Any person can abandon his domicile of choice by ceasing to reside[87] in the country where he is domiciled and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely.  He may prove this[88] by, for instance, establishing the acquisition of another domicile of choice.  He may, however, abandon his existing domicile of choice without obtaining another one.[89]  In this case, his domicile of origin will then revive and apply automatically until he acquires a new domicile.  Budd J summarised the position well: 

"A person abandons a domicil of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely and not otherwise.  On abandoning a domicil of choice, a person either acquires a new domicil of choice or resumes his domicil of origin."[90] 

 

Domicile in Malaysia

 

In Malaysia, any person being sui juris (not an infant or a mentally incapable person) has the ability to acquire a domicile of choice.  The age of majority is eighteen years.[91]  It is still the common law which governs the acquisition and abandonment of domicile of choice in Malaysia.  A person can obtain his domicile of choice by establishing his chief residence in the country in which he wishes to be domiciled, and by having the intention of residing there permanently or indefinitely.  The intention need not be directed to the acquisition of domicile,[92] but an individual must have a definite and final intention of changing the existing domicile.[93]   No single fact is ever decisive or too trivial.[94]  Each trivial fact of a person's life is relevant, such as membership of social clubs.[95] 

Continued residence is not required to retain a newly acquired domicile of choice.  In other words, a person will not lose his domicile of choice merely because he is frequently absent from the country of domicile.  He can, however, abandon his domicile of choice by ceasing to reside in the country concerned and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely.  Lord Hatherley, the Lord Chancellor, stated in Udny v Udny:[96] 

"It seems reasonable to say that if the choice of new abode and actual settlement there constitute a change of the original domicile, then the exact converse of such a procedure, viz, the intention to abandon the new domicile, and an actual abandonment of it, ought to be equally effective to destroy the new domicile.  That which may be acquired may surely be abandoned…". 

Upon abandoning his domicile of choice, a person either acquires a new domicile of choice or his domicile of origin revives.[97] 

 

Domicile in New Zealand

 

A person becomes capable of acquiring an independent domicile on reaching sixteen years of age or on marrying at an earlier age.[98]  This is subject to the common law rule that the mentally incapable cannot acquire an independent domicile.[99]  Once a person becomes capable of obtaining an independent domicile, he continues to be so capable.[100]  The domicile a person has immediately before becoming capable of obtaining an independent domicile of choice continues until he in fact acquires a new domicile under the Act, and will then cease.[101]  He acquires a new domicile in a country at a particular time if, immediately before that time, he: 

(a)       is not domiciled in that country;

(b)       is capable of obtaining an independent domicile;

(c)        is in that country; and

(d)       intends to live there indefinitely.[102] 

In the absence of an intention to live in the country concerned indefinitely, mere long residence there will not suffice.[103]  The domicile acquired in the above manner continues until another domicile is acquired in the same manner.[104]  The common law doctrine of revival of domicile of origin is abolished.[105] 

 

Domicile in Singapore 

The law governing a person's domicile of choice in Singapore is the same as that in Malaysia.[106]  The difference is that the age of majority in Singapore is the common law age of twenty-one years.[107]  In all other respects, the discussion above on Malaysia also applies to Singapore. 

 

Domicile in South Africa 

Any person who is of or over the age of eighteen years, or who is under that age but otherwise by law has the status of a major, has the ability to acquire a domicile of choice, regardless of the sex or marital status of that person.[108]  However, this does not apply to a person who does not have the mental capacity to make a rational choice.[109]  In order to obtain a domicile of choice in a place, a person needs to be lawfully present there and to have the intention to settle there for an indefinite period.[110] 

A person's existing domicile continues until he acquires another by his own choice or by operation of law.[111]  The concept of revival of a person's domicile of origin no longer applies.[112] 

 

Domicile in United Kingdom 

In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, any mentally capable person becomes capable of acquiring an independent domicile on attaining the age of sixteen or on marrying under that age.[113]  He remains domiciled in the country where he was domiciled immediately before either event until, as a matter of fact, he acquires a new domicile.  If he abandons his existing domicile without acquiring a new one, his domicile of origin will revive.  The position is more or less the same in Scotland, with the difference that marrying under sixteen years of age is irrelevant to the legal capacity in respect of domicile there.[114]

 

Once able to acquire an independent domicile, a person can acquire a domicile of choice in a country by fulfilling the requirements as to residence and intention of permanently or indefinitely residing there.[115]  As in Hong Kong, "residence" involves no more than mere physical presence, and the "intention" must be general and indefinite in its future contemplation, not just for a limited period or particular purpose.[116]  A person can abandon his domicile of choice by ceasing to reside in that country and no longer intending to reside there permanently or indefinitely.[117]  On abandoning his domicile of choice, he may acquire another domicile of choice.  Otherwise, his domicile of origin will revive.[118] 


 

[1]               Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, at 448, 453, 457; Bell v. Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307, at 320; Re Craignish [1892] 3 Ch 180, at 192.

[2]               Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, at 448.  It has been suggested that a person may have different domiciles for different purposes: Att-Gen v Rowe (1862) 1 H & C 31, at 45 and Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam 106, at 132-133.  However, according to Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (13th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000 at para 6-015), this proposition would raise many problems which are as yet unresolved.  At para 6-016, it recognised that to a very limited extent, a person could be domiciled in two different countries for different purposes at the same time.

[3]               Att-Gen v Rowe (1862) 1 H & C 31, at 42; Bell v. Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307, at 319.

[4]               Winans v Att-Gen [1904] AC 287.

[5]               Winans v Att-Gen [1904] AC 287,at 290.

[6]               Re Martin [1900] P 211, at 227(CA).

[7]               Section 8(1) of the Domicile Act, 1982 (Commonwealth).

[8]               Section 8(2) of the Domicile Act, 1982 (Commonwealth).

[9]               Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307.

[10]             Lim v Lim [1973] VR 370.

[11]             In the Marriage of Salacup (1993) 17 Fam LR 141.

[12]             Section 7 of the Domicile Act 1982 (Commonwealth).

[13]             (1971) 18 FLR 461(Sugerman ACJ consenting; Taylor AJA dissenting).

[14]             (1971) 18 FLR 461 at 464.

[15]             (1971) 18 FLR 461 at 464.

[16]             (1971) 18 FLR 461 at 464.

[17]             Humphries v Humphries [1992] NZFLR 18.

[18]             Section 10 of the Domicile Act 1982 (Commonwealth).

[19]             Section 9(d) of the Domicile Act 1976, New Zealand.

[20]             But see the contrary view: "If this is the correct interpretation of s 10 it only clarifies but does not change the common law.  It does, however, seem strange that persons who have lived in a country for decades are held not to have acquired a domicile there because of an intention which at the date of the hearing was never acted upon.  Surely that cannot have been the intention and purpose of the legislation." in P E Nygh, Conflict of Laws in Australia, Butterworths, 6th Ed, 1995, at 209.

[21]             Section 7 of the Domicile Act 1982 (Commonwealth).

[22]             Section 7 of the Domicile and Habitual Residence Act 1983, Manitoba.

[23]             Section 8(1) of the Domicile and Habitual Residence Act 1983, Manitoba.

[24]             Section 8(2) of the Domicile and Habitual Residence Act 1983, Manitoba.

[25]             Marvin Baer and others, Private International Law in Common Law Canada, Cases, Text and Materials, Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, Toronto Canada, 1997 at 131.

[26]             Section 3(a) of the Domicile and Habitual Residence Act 1983, Manitoba.

[27]             Section 6 of the Domicile and Habitual Residence Act 1983, Manitoba.

[28]             Section 2 of the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 410).

[29]             In the Goods of Patten (1860) 6 Jur (NS) 151; Re Macreight (1885) 30 Ch D 165.

[30]             Henderson v Henderson [1967] P 77.  See the following paragraphs on "Revival of domicile of origin".

[31]             Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307.

[32]             Manning v Manning (1871) LR 2 P & D 223, at 226.  The decision was not on a point of domicile.

[33]             IRC v Duchess of Portland [1982] Ch 314, at 318-9.

[34]             Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 6-034.

[35]             Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at R11 para 6R‑046.

[36]             Bell v. Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307, at 319; Stone v Stone [1958] 1 WLR 1287.

[37]             Fasbender v Att-Gen [1922] 2 Ch 850, at 857-858.

[38]             White v Tennant, 31 W Va 790, 8 SE 596 (1888).

[39]             Att-Gen v Pottinger (1861) 6 H & N 733, at 747-748.

[40]             Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, at 458.

[41]             Bell v. Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307.

[42]             Gulbenkian v Gulbenkian [1937] 4 All E R 618.

[43]             Re Annesley [1926] Ch 692, at 701.

[44]             Bell v Bell [1922] 2 IR 152; Re Flynn [1968] 1 WLR 103.

[45]             In the Estate Fuld (No 3) [1968] P 675, at 685; IRC v Bullock [1976] 1 WLR 1178 (CA).

[46]             In the Estate Fuld (No 3) [1968] P 675, at 684.

[47]             Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at R11 para 6R-046.  See also Drevon v Drevon (1864) 34 LJ Ch 129, at 133: "there is no act, no circumstance in a man's life, however trivial it may be in itself, which ought to be left out of consideration in trying the question whether there was an intention to change the domicile.  A trivial act might possibly be of more weight with regard to determining this question than an act which was of more importance to a man in his life-time."

[48]             Drevon v Drevon (1864) 34 LJ Ch 129.

[49]             Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, at 450.

[50]             Lyall v Paton (1856) 25 LJ Ch 746.

[51]             In the Goods of Raffenel (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 49; IRC v Duchess of Portland [1982] Ch 314.

[52]             Re Flynn (No 1) [1968] 1 WLR 103, at p113-5, per Megarry J (obiter); Qureshi v Qureshi [1972] Fam 173, at 191.

[53]             Re Marrett (1887) 36 Ch D 400 (CA).

[54]             See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 6-075 for this submission.

[55]             Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441.

[56]             See the following paragraphs for the situation in which married women can have their own independent domicile for certain limited purposes.

[57]             In Re Scullard [1957] Ch 107, the spouses had separated for 46 years and were in different countries for about 30 of those years.

[58]             Warrender v Warrrender (1835) 2 Cl & F 488.  See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th Ed, 1967) at 113, Rule 13.

[59]             AG for Alberta v Cook [1926] AC 444.

[60]             De Reneville v De Reneville [1948] P 100.

[61]             De Reneville v De Reneville [1948] P 100.

[62]             Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 6-086.

[63]             "Mental incapacity" (精神上無行為能力) is widely defined in section 2 of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap 136): meaning "(a) mental disorder; or (b) mental handicap, and "mentally incapacitated" (精神上無行為能力) shall be construed accordingly."  

            "Mental disorder" (精神紊亂) means- "a) mental illness; (b) a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which amounts to a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning which is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person concerned; c) psychopathic disorder; or (d) any other disorder or disability of mind which does not amount to mental handicap, and "mentally disordered" (精神紊亂) shall be construed accordingly".

                "Mental handicap" (弱智) means "sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficiencies in adaptive behaviour, and "mentally handicapped" shall be construed accordingly".

[64]              No authority can be found on this point.  See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 6-107 for this submission.

[65]             See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 6-107 for this submission.  The reason is that the use of these measures depends, in part at least, on the practice of social workers and hospital staff which may be more closely related to the immediate circumstances and willingness to co-operate of the patient than to factors relevant to the law of domicile.

[66]             Hepburn v Skirving (1861) 9 WR 764.

[67]             Urquhart v Butterfield (1887) 37 Ch D 357, at 382 (CA); but Cotton LJ added the qualification: "whatever his wish may have been."

[68]             Sharpe v Crispin (1869) LR 1 P & D 611 (but in this case, the court held that if the person in question was capable of choosing a domicile he had, as a matter of fact, chosen that of his father).  Re G [1966] NZLR 1028.

[69]             Jopp v Wood (1865) 4 DJ & S 616; Winans v Att-Gen [1904] AC 287.

[70]             Winans v Att-Gen [1904] AC 287; Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] AC 588.

[71]             Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307, at 321 per Lord Westbury; Winans v Att-Gen [1904] AC 287, at 292 per Lord Macnaghten.

[72]             Henderson v Henderson [1967] P 77 at 80 per Sir Jocelyn Simon P.

[73]             In the Estate Fuld (No 3) [1968] P 675, at 685-6; Buswell v IRC [1974] 1 WLR 1631, at 1637.

 

[74]             Section 9 of the Indian Succession Act 1925.

[75]             Section 18 of the Indian Succession Act 1925.

[76]             Section 2(e) of the Indian Succession Act 1925.

[77]             1955 SC 36.

[78]             Kedar Pande v Narayan Bikram Shah 1966 SC 160.

[79]             Explanation to Section 10 of the Indian Succession Act 1925.

[80]             Section 13 of the Indian Succession Act 1925.

[81]             Section 2(1).

[82]             William Binchy, Irish Conflicts of Law, 1988, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd, at 55.

[83]             Davies v Adair [1895] 1 IR 379 at 425.

[84]             (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, at 458.

[85]             Davies v Adair [1895] 1 IR 379 at 437.

[86]             William Binchy, Irish Conflicts of Law, 1988, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd, at 53.

[87]             Bank of Ireland Trustee Co Ltd v Adams [1967] IR 424, at 452.

[88]             Revenue Commissioners v Shaw [1982] ILRM 433, at 436 (High Court, McWilliam J).

[89]             Sproule v Hopkins [1903] 2 IR 133, at 138 (KB Div, Andrews J).

[90]             Bank of Ireland Trustee Co Ltd v Adams [1967] IR 424, at 434.

[91]             Section 2 of the Age of Majority Act 1971, Malaysia.

[92]             Russell J in Re Annesley [1926] Ch 692.

[93]             Re Eu Keng Chee [1961] MLJ 210.

[94]             Yap Tow On v Woon Ngee Yew [1940] MLJ 96 (the fact of erecting a tombstone for the parents).

[95]             Joseph Wong Phui Lun v Yeoh Loon Goit [1978] 1 MLJ 236.

[96]             Udny